EU funding must add value, not replace national spending

Additionality ensures that EU funds add to, rather than replace, national spending. As this core principle has eroded, so too has the impact of public investment, with rising risks of double spending and limited real-world results – a concern particularly visible in countries like Hungary. The upcoming Social Climate Fund offers a chance to put this principle back at the heart of EU funding, writes EEB member Orsolya Keményffy.

Orsolya Keményffy is Policy Officer at Clean Air Action Group (CAAG) in Hungary.

The EU’s principle of additionality is simple: European funds should complement national spending, not substitute for it. When respected, it ensures that EU money accelerates progress, strengthens cohesion, and delivers real benefits for citizens. When ignored, it opens the door to double funding, weak accountability, corruption and declining trust in EU policies, and in some cases allows EU resources to be used for short-term political convenience rather than long-term public interest.

Yet over the past 15 years, additionality has been steadily sidelined in EU funding rules. The result is a growing gap between what EU money is meant to achieve – and what it actually delivers on the ground.

A principle quietly dismantled

Additionality once had teeth. In the 2007–2013 period, Member States had to demonstrate that EU Cohesion Funds did not replace national investment. Public spending levels were agreed in advance, monitored during implementation, and verified afterwards. Despite the administrative burden, the system worked: even after the financial crisis, almost all countries ultimately complied.

Instead of improving this framework for the better, the EU weakened it. Monitoring was simplified in the 2014–2020 financial period and then effectively abandoned in the current (2021–2027) period. The regulatory framework has shifted towards a more flexible, results-based programming model, and the prominence of the additionality principle has further diminished. Today, the European Commission no longer requires Member States to demonstrate the additionality of EU-funded programmes.

The European Court of Auditors has been clear about the consequences. In its 2023 assessment, it warned that dismantling additionality checks increases the risk of double funding and undermines EU added value, especially as funding instruments multiply and overlap.

Why this matters now

The erosion of additionality is happening at a particularly risky moment. EU funding is becoming increasingly complex, while the next programming period is now expected to place greater emphasis on flexibility for Member States with funds integrated into a single National and Regional Partnership Plan. Without strong safeguards, governments can simply relabel existing policies as “EU-funded”, freeing up national budgets for other priorities – or worse, for purposes that contradict EU objectives.

This risk is not merely theoretical. Studies have questioned whether the additionality principle has been consistently respected in practice. Evidence cited in a Bruegel analysis suggests that in some cases EU funds have substituted for national spending, such as in the Baltic countries’ higher education sector. This concern is reinforced by evidence from Hungary, where analysis has found that EU subsidies to companies did not lead to stronger growth or performance compared to non-subsidised firms. More broadly, this suggests that some EU-supported investments would likely have taken place anyway, or deliver limited economic, social, or environmental benefit. That is not added value – it is missed opportunity.

The Social Climate Fund: a chance to reset

Against this backdrop, the Social Climate Fund (SCF) stands out. Unlike most current EU instruments, it explicitly restores the additionality principle. SCF money can only support new or scaled-up measures to address the social impacts of carbon pricing – not existing schemes repackaged with EU labels. This is a welcome step. It recognises that citizens will only support ambitious climate policy if EU funds genuinely improve their lives, rather than replacing national responsibilities.

But this is just the first step. While the SCF regulation is clear on intent, the Commission has not yet set out how additionality will be assessed or verified in practice. Without clear rules, monitoring risks becoming a box-ticking exercise – or disappearing altogether.

Additionality is not red tape, it is protection

Critics often frame additionality as bureaucratic or inflexible. Experience shows otherwise. During the 2007–2013 period, mid-term reviews allowed adjustments while preserving accountability. Re-establishing additionality does not mean returning to excessive paperwork. It means agreeing on clear definitions, comparable data, proportionate checks, and consequences when rules are broken. In short, it means treating EU funds as a shared investment – not free money.

A test of EU credibility

As the EU prepares future budgets, additionality is becoming a credibility test. If EU funds merely replace national spending, citizens pay twice and trust erodes. If they genuinely add value, they can accelerate cohesion and climate action, support vulnerable households, and strengthen European solidarity. In times of turbulence such as today, allowing this principle to erode is a dangerous trajectory: it undermines policy clarity, creates space for political misuse, and weakens cohesion across the European Union.

The Social Climate Fund offers a second chance. The question is whether the EU will seize it – or allow another core principle to quietly fade away.

This article draws on a more detailed analysis by the author, available here.